Posted on October 20, 2008 in Automobile Accident

Nissan recently decided to recall 204,361 vehicles from its 2007 and 2008 model years in the United States due to the possibility that a passenger side airbag could fail to deploy properly in an accident. The recall covers 2007 and 2008 Nissan Altima, Altima Coupe, 350Z, Murano and Rogue; and Infiniti G35 Sedan, G37 Coupe and EX35 built from March 12, 2007 to May 27, 2008. Please click here for the full article.

The defect was in the passenger side “Occupant Classification System,” which figures out whether the front passenger is present, and if so, whether it’s a child or small adult. Apparently, the problem is with Nissan’s “Occupant Classification System,” which didn’t work properly since it was out of spec. As a consequence, the passenger airbag may not deploy in a serious crash.

For more information regarding Nissan’s recall, or to speak with a trial attorney with experience litigating similar product liability claims against automobile manufacturers, please contact us for a free consultation.

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 Posted on October 20, 2008 in Treatment

Lawyers wear many hats including advocate, counselor and legal strategist. Often times, the many roles of a lawyer conflict with one another. Not so when it comes to advising DUI defendants to seek an alcohol evaluation and/or treatment. Not only does such a referral help the client on a personal level, but it assists the lawyer before both the criminal judge and the administrative judge (MVA hearing).

Every DUI defendant who consults with our law firm is provided a list of court certified alcohol education and treatment facilities. It is recommended that the client schedule an immediate appointment, answer the evaluators questions honestly and follow the recommendations of the counselor. If a person is deemed to have an alcohol dependency, in-patient and out-patient options will be discussed. Most problem drinkers will benefit from an out-patient program which may span from 12-48 weeks. In-patient treatment referrals are common for egregious cases and repeat offenders. The length varies.

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 Posted on October 19, 2008 in Controlled Dangerous Substances (CDS)

Many federal criminal defense attorneys are not aware of the pitfalls of the federal safety valve provisions. Persons charged with federal drug crimes need to retain an experienced criminal attorney familiar with all aspects of federal criminal law. An inexperienced or unknowing lawyer can expose a client to catastrophic risks. Here is why.

As we are all keenly aware, the federal government’s “war on drugs” is ensnaring hundreds of people with little or no criminal records who are caught up, for a myriad of reasons, with the distribution of drugs. This can range from a person carrying cash for a friend to pay for an airline ticket, to delivering a package to another person in exchange for cash to pay the rent or feed a child. Because of very harsh federal sentencing laws, the smallest players in a drug ring often end up being the most harshly treated. Most of time this is because the leaders of drug operations very often end up cooperating against others – including those below them whose “loyalty” they often gained through fear and threats of harm. Oftentimes, those persons caught on the lowest rungs of a drug conspiracy find themselves with few alternatives because they do not have significant information to provide to federal prosecutors, who retain exclusive control over who gets cooperation departures under the federal sentencing guidelines. As a result, defendants with minor or minimal culpability in a drug operation frequently end up on the receiving end of prosecutions involving tremendously high sentencing guidelines and, more critically, large minimum mandatory sentences.

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 Posted on October 19, 2008 in Infection Malpractice

Last week, a Chicago man settled a medical malpractice case for $10 million against two groups representing doctors that he sued. In 2003, the man, a 33-year-old vice president at one of the country’s largest information technology staffing firms, was doing great. One year earlier, he had been diagnosed with a routine heart valve condition, a murmur and bicuspid heart valve, leaving him at risk of infective endocarditis, a buildup of bacteria around the heart valve
The heart condition led to the infection in his heart, but doctors with a local hospital repeatedly misdiagnosed it, sending the man home with allergy medication once and instructions on visiting a back specialist another time. The undiagnosed infection led to a piece of the infection breaking free and traveling to the man’s brain, according to the lawsuit. That caused a stroke that left the man with severe physical and mental disabilities, including severe damage to his language center. The man, a father of two children, still suffers from seizures, has no use of one of his hands and has difficulty walking, talking and reading.

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 Posted on October 17, 2008 in Insurance Carriers

Homeowners insurance, depending upon the exact language, normally excludes intentional acts by insured that cause injury. A policy that excludes coverage for “damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured,” has been interpreted as excluding coverage for results that were subjectively intended by insured’s act. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sparks, 63 Md. App. 738, 742 (1985). Moreover, the court has interpreted “intent” within the insurance policy as, “…desires to cause consequences…or believes that such consequences are substantially certain to result from his conduct.” Id. at 744 (emphasis added). However, the court has distinguished “intentional” from “wanton,” in noting that “wanton” conduct is described as consequences probably certain to result. Id. (emphasis added). Under such analysis, homeowners insurance would cover for an insured’s wanton conduct causing injury to a trespasser.

A federal case, using Maryland law, discussed a policy excluding coverage for acts by the insured that “reasonably expected or intended to cause a loss.” The court stated the exclusion language applied to insured’s conduct of kicking in bathroom stall door that resulted in the door hitting the plaintiff and causing injuries. Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Puig, 64 F. Supp.2d 514 (1999). The court in Blue Ridge Ins. Co., distinguished the case with Allstate Ins. Co., on the fact that the insurance policy in Blue Ridge Ins. Co., excluded acts “reasonably expected…to cause a loss” as opposed to the language contained in the policy in Allstate Ins. Co. (excluding coverage for damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.)

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 Posted on October 17, 2008 in Automobile Accident

As leading Maryland personal injury lawyers, we are often asked to explain Maryland law regarding wrongful death lawsuits.

Generally, a wrongful death claim is brought by a surviving spouse, child or parent. A Survival claim is brought by the personal representative of an estate.

To recover for a Wrongful Death cause of action, plaintiff must prove: 1) death; 2) negligence of the defendant; and 3) defendant’s negligence proximately caused death of decedent. Weimer v. Hetrick, 309 Md. 536, 547 (1987). In addition to the elements set out by case law, the Wrongful Death statute provides that the plaintiff must be within a category of defined beneficiaries under the statute and the claim must be brought within the applicable time period, 3 years after death of decedent. Md. Cts & Jud. Proc. Art. § 3-904.

To recover for a Survival cause of action, plaintiff must prove: 1) defendant’s negligence was direct and proximate cause of decedent’s injuries; 2) decedent lived after the injury; and 3) between time of injury and time of death, decedent experienced conscious pain. Tri-state Poultry Coop. v. Carey, 190 Md. 116, 125 (1948).

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 Posted on October 17, 2008 in Premises Liability

A trespasser is classified as one who enters another’s property intentionally and without consent or privilege. The only duty owed to a trespasser is to “abstain from wilful or wanton misconduct.” Doehring v. Wagner, 562 A.2d 762, 767 (1989); Carroll v. Spencer, 204 Md. 387, 394 (1954) (emphasis added). A “wanton” act is one performed with reckless indifference to potentially injurious consequences. Doehring, 562 A.2d at 767; Wells v. Poland, 120 Md. App. 699, 719 (1998). Moreover, “wanton” conduct is that which is “extremely dangerous and outrageous,” with reckless disregard of others rights. Wells, 120 Md. App. at 719. However, although the above cases define “wanton,” the standard applied by the court to trigger liability to trespassers is higher. The majority of cases use such language as “conduct calculated to or reasonably expected to lead to injury of the trespasser.” Doehring, 562 A.2d at 762; Wells, 120 Md. App. at 721 (emphasis added). For example in Doehring, defendant placing chain across driveway to prevent motorcycles from accessing was not willful or wanton conduct, even though defendant was aware of prior use of driveway by motorcycles. Id.

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 Posted on October 17, 2008 in Sexual Child Abuse

In 1994 New Jersey became one of the first states to implement sex offender registry and notification laws. New Jersey enacted what became known as “Megan’s Law,” or the Sex Offender Registration Act, in response to a brutal sexual assault and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by a convicted sex offender who lived across the street from her. Congress responded that same year by implementing their version of Megan’s Law, called the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program (“Wetterling Act”). Pub.L.No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000). The Wetterling Act, drafted to protect the public from violent sex offenses committed by repeat offenders, developed guidelines for registration, and more recently, community notification, and classified its registrants as “sexually violent offenders” or “sexually violent predators,” the latter of which was forced to comply with heightened registration requirements. Id. at § 14071. See generally, 61 Md. Law Rev. 739, 722-45 (2002). The Wetterling Act also mandates that each State may decide to what extent that information will be made available to the public. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-55 (1986).

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 Posted on October 17, 2008 in Child Abuse

Many Marylanders are often wrongly accused of child abuse. Police and prosecutors are often too quick to rush to judgment and fail to do a complete investigation. In several cases, I have been able to exonerate innocent defendants by obtaining the Social Service records of the alleged child-victim. These sealed records, although sometimes difficult to obtain, often point to the real abuser.

The problem arises when a child shows physical signs of obvious abuse. One case I had involving a teacher being charged with physically abusing a 7 year old student. The school nurse had seen marks on the child and inquired the source. Rather than point the finger at the true abuser-the child’s mother- the child thought it would be simpler to wrongfully accuse a teacher. In the child’s mind, it was better to accuse an innocent teacher (whom the child disliked anyway) than point the finger at the true abuser, who the child otherwise loved and relied upon.

In general, it is unlawful for anyone to divulge information concerning social service records. Maryland law states when records may be divulged. This is not a mandatory provision but a discretionary one.

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 Posted on October 17, 2008 in Federal Criminal Defense

In federal criminal cases, defense attorneys may use extrinsic evidence to show a witness’ bias, but you may not use is to impeach by showing a specific instance of conduct.

FRE 608(b) states: Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness

(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross- examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.

The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused’s or the witness’ privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.

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